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Thank you Mr Chairman,
The profound worldwide economic slowdown, which in the industrialised countries has al-
ready turned into a rapid and sharp recession, is undoubtedly the most serious since the 1929 
Great Depression. In recent months, the collapse of international fi nancial markets has been 
averted only with great diffi culty and we don’t yet know what the fi nal consequences of the 
events unfolding will be for the real economy.
Faced with this situation, all efforts will inevitably focus on attempting to exit the crisis. Interna-
tionally, and within Spain, hitherto inconceivable measures have been adopted, such as unlim-
ited liquidity injections by central banks, extensive fi scal stimuli and exceptional support to the 
fi nancial system. Naturally enough, governments, politicians, central bankers, supervisors and 
academics are all contributing to these tasks. And it is not surprising, therefore, that all my 
speeches in recent months have been to analyse the causes of the global crisis and to review 
the various measures to tackle it.
However, on receiving your much appreciated invitation, I thought I’d take advantage of the 
sense of calm refl ection which university fora instil to pause and ponder on what may happen 
to the Spanish economy after the crisis, when the global economy recovers.
It is worth refl ecting on the aftermath because the global nature of the crisis is “homogenising” 
the different economies. And by blurring the differences from one economy to another, it is 
hard to discern the different tasks awaiting them. As the crisis left nobody unscathed, not even 
those countries which acted prudently, i.e. those that did not incur excessive debt or whose 
competitiveness did not worsen, are faring better than those which were not so virtuous. But 
when the crisis ends, differences will re-emerge. 
When a plane taking off from New York almost crashed last month, the health and well-being 
of all the passengers hinged on how the crisis was resolved, without this depending on their 
youth, cholesterol levels, excess weight or the state of their lungs. The drama was the same 
for everybody. Luckily, they all emerged safe and sound from the landing on the Hudson. But 
after that, with the crisis behind, their health and well-being depends once again on the state 
of their organs, diet and exercise, and on taking the right medicine.
Countries worldwide have entered into a similar negative spiral (a deep slowdown in – and in 
some cases the collapse of – consumption, employment, output, credit, investment...). And 
that might feed the illusion that, once the recession is behind, all countries will recover in the 
same way. But that will not be so. Each country has singular features that will prove pivotal 
when defi ning the path to follow once the crisis is over. Accordingly, my refl ections will focus 
on what distinguishes us from others.
The Spanish experience shows that, from 1985 to 2008, growth in the economy was outpac-
ing the EU average, with the sole exception of 1992 and 1993. This spectacular growth over 
the past 23 years has allowed us to draw closer to the welfare levels enjoyed by the most 
prosperous EU countries. But what will happen to the Spanish economy when we emerge 
from the current crisis? Will we witness such satisfactory growth as in the past? 
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The reply, as always in economics, is that “it depends”. If we do what we have to do, if the 
necessary reforms are made, we will once again grow above the European average. But if we 
do not reform we will probably grow at or below the EU average, with convergence with our 
main economic partners being checked. 
Yet if we have been able so far to advance without these reforms, is it absolutely vital to adopt 
them now? Before answering that, let us look at the causes of growth in the Spanish economy 
in recent decades. Such high growth may prove surprising given our economy’s shortcomings 
or weaknesses: a much lower level of educational attainment than other European countries, 
low capital stock, inferior technology and labour institutions which, as we shall see, do not 
generate the incentives needed to enhance individual and collective effi ciency. Why, despite 
this, have we grown so much? Partly because we made more progress than the other coun-
tries in some areas, which has offset our relative shortcomings.
First, the relative weight of our public sector is much lower than that of the other European 
countries. Consequently, the greater weight of the private sector accounts for the greater dy-
namism of our economy. Next, public spending has been decentralised in a manner akin to 
Germany after World War II, and, to date, that has allowed greater effi ciency in the allocation 
of spending. Further, we have also been bolder than other countries in privatisation. In recent 
decades there have been many signifi cant privatisations in practically all productive sectors, 
allowing us to push ahead more than other economies in infusing competition into many 
goods and services markets. Unlike in other countries, privatisation has been wholesale, which 
is essential for breaking the link between corporations and governments. Finally, up to 2007 
Spain managed notable progress in terms of balancing public fi nances and reducing public 
debt. All these aspects might be viewed as some of the inherent virtues of the Spanish econ-
omy, which account for much of our favourable growth differential over the past 20 years.
What is most surprising is that our economy has been growing despite progressively losing 
external competitiveness. The growth of our prices, unit wage costs and business margins has 
outpaced those of the euro area. This has ultimately resulted in a sizable current-account 
defi cit which, though it may be seen as excessive investment relative to saving, also indicates 
Spain’s insuffi cient competitiveness, with very poor productivity gains.
And how has it been possible to grow in the last 23 years despite losing competitiveness? 
Because in addition to the above factors or “inherent virtues”, Spain has had access to other 
possibilities which have also helped it grow. There are two in particular. 
The fi rst was the resort to devaluation. Though the last devaluation was in 1995, this instru-
ment was available until 1999, when Spain entered the euro area. Devaluation allowed losses 
in competitiveness to be absorbed – without the labour market being reformed or corrective 
measures being taken to enhance productivity – by means of reducing real wages, increasing 
import prices and improving the relative prices of products sold abroad.
But let’s not deceive ourselves. Periodic devaluations, though providing temporary relief that 
allowed necessary structural adjustments to be postponed, entailed huge costs and kept 
private agents in a setting of fi nancial and exchange-rate instability far from conducive to sus-
tained growth.
During our decade in the euro area we have also grown at a higher rate than our partners, 
despite not having the resort to devaluation. How has that been possible? Along with the effect 
of the positive factors I mentioned earlier, we should also highlight euro area membership for 
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what it has meant in terms of stability and reducing uncertainty, and the contribution of immi-
gration, which has added notable fl exibility to the Spanish economy.
Unquestionably, though, a decisive factor in growth from 1999 to 2008 was the extraordinary 
increase in household and corporate debt. In that decade, Spanish domestic demand growth 
was double that of the European Union because private agents’ debt rose twofold in the
1999-2007 period. As a proportion of gross disposable income, household debt climbed from 
little more than 60% to 130%, and corporate debt from 270% to almost 600% of the gross 
operating surplus.
The problem facing us on emerging from the crisis is that although this swift indebtedness 
drove the increase in domestic demand and, therefore, in economic growth in recent years, 
the high level attained will prevent debt from growing in the future at a similar rate to what it did 
in the past. Moreover, for several years we may well witness a debt reduction or deleveraging 
process, meaning its effect on domestic demand will be the opposite of what it was in the 
past, reducing our growth rate.
The Spanish economy’s main problem, then, is that its future looks very different from its past 
since the two possibilities I mentioned – devaluation and increased debt – have disappeared. 
Thus, even if our economy’s many strengths (a very small public sector, privatisation, low pub-
lic debt, etc.) remain in place and there is no slippage in progress made, Spain will face more 
demanding situations for having forgone these two possibilities. Naturally, were we to back-
track on competition, for instance, or were the budget defi cit to surge to unsustainable levels, 
our growth would be even more severely impacted, as occurred in the past decade in some 
European countries.
The only possible means here of recouping the external competitiveness lost following the lat-
est upturn is to increase our productivity. And higher productivity, in addition to requiring a 
priority focus on education and training, inevitably involves structural reforms in numerous 
fi elds. As we have limited time, I’ll refer exclusively to the reform of labour institutions, where 
the Banco de España researchers have made most valuable contributions. Also, this is surely 
the reform that can most contribute to resolving the problem most concerning Spaniards, 
namely unemployment. Yet while not mentioning them today, we should remember there are 
many other vital structural reforms needed, such as that of the rental market, boosting compe-
tition in services, railway freight transport, energy, public administration, etc., and that can also 
contribute to enhancing productivity and to a return to higher growth than the EU average. 
Clearly, inadequate labour institutions generate very harmful effects not only on productivity 
and economic growth, but also on employee welfare. Spaniards need little convincing of the 
problems unemployment poses, problems which assail us even when the business cycle is 
buoyant. In the past year we regrettably posted once again the highest unemployment rate in 
the OECD; and furthermore, the speed at which joblessness in Spain is increasing during the 
current crisis is the fastest among all the developed countries.
In countries facing a contraction in activity similar to that in Spain, the unemployment rate rose 
only slightly last year (e.g. by 0.2 pp in France), or even fell (Germany). We might argue that 
these countries show much lower increases in the labour force than Spain and that the expan-
sion in their construction sectors was not comparable. The problem is that when we compare 
with countries that do have these two characteristics, such as the United States or the United 
Kingdom, Spain’s unemployment increase continues to stand out. Specifi cally, the US unem-
ployment rate rose by “only” 2.3 pp in 2008, somewhat more than in the United Kingdom, 
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where the increase from January to October 2008 was 1.4 pp. These are very moderate in-
creases when compared with the fi gure of over 5 pp for Spain in 2008. Evidently, the Spanish 
economy’s labour adjustment mechanisms are not working properly. 
Another harmful effect of an ineffi cient labour market is that it reduces the room for workers’ 
real compensation to improve. In recent years, the Spanish economy has had to compete 
abroad on the basis of holding down its real labour costs, which was imposed by the econo-
my’s low productivity. This has direct consequences for everybody’s welfare, particularly so for 
those groups most adversely affected in terms of both wages and unemployment, namely 
women and the young.
These particularities of workers’ situation in Spain compared with other developed countries 
– higher unemployment, even in the good times, a swifter increase in unemployment in adjust-
ment phases, lower real wage growth, lower labour productivity growth, greater discrimination 
against certain groups – match the singularity of our labour institutions when compared with 
those countries. There is a long list of areas where we differ: the practical impossibility of opt-
ing out of collective bargaining, the scant share of compensation in corporate profi ts, wage 
indexation mechanisms with no connection to fi rms’ situation, State intervention through man-
datory authorisations that prevent fi rms from increasing their productivity, etc. But as time 
presses, I’ll focus on just one of these particularities: the way in which we provide for the un-
employment contingency. 
Spain continues to adhere to unemployment contingency arrangements which, formerly, were 
similar to those in other European countries, but which have all been reformed in recent dec-
ades. Under our system, assistance to the unemployed combines a government benefi t with the 
payment of a one-off amount related to the time the benefi ciary was at a single company. This 
amount is payable by fi rms, not the State, and it is occasionally the biggest portion of the assist-
ance to the unemployed. All these features lead to numerous ineffi ciencies in the system, which 
makes for lower productivity and categorical failure in the goal of reducing unemployment.
Under its current design, unemployment compensation is an absolute deterrent to labour 
mobility, since it depends on workers’ years of service at the last fi rm at which they were em-
ployed. And in today’s world the reallocation of workers from one fi rm to another is crucial if 
the economy is to adjust suitably to the rapid changes unfolding in demand and in technolo-
gies. In that way, workers move from fi rms in decline to those pursuing more productive ac-
tivities. The compensation system in force is not conducive either to the start-up or growth of 
more productive fi rms. And not only because it deters employers, discouraging new hires. 
Spanish workers themselves ultimately do not accept changing job because even though 
more productive fi rms may offer them substantially better wages, the change does not com-
pensate for the fact that any severance payment would be back to zero in their new job. 
The fact that unemployment protection largely resides on a compensation package (which is 
colloquially known as fi ring costs) payable exclusively by the private sector also adds numer-
ous distortions. The fundamental one is that it discourages company start-ups and hiring in 
general, a matter which, while important, is all the more so now that the inevitable and massive 
reduction in employment in housebuilding needs to be offset by job creation in other sectors. 
The Spanish system is ineffi cient. Yet it would be absurd to ignore the fact that the Spanish 
public largely believes the current system protects workers. And clearly, if there is no wide-
spread awareness of the harm the system causes, there will be no reforms. It is therefore ab-
solutely vital to study and publicise the reforms other European countries have undertaken, 
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choosing those alternatives that allow us to raise our productivity, and thus our external com-
petitiveness, to increase our per capita income and quality of life, and to improve the condi-
tions of the most disadvantaged groups. 
In many respects the current situation of labour protection can be equated with the trade pro-
tectionism characterising the Spanish economy until the late 1950s. During that period, import 
tariffs and quotas were very high in comparison with those in other developed countries. The 
belief until then was that trade protectionism shielded Spanish fi rms and workers, but nothing 
was further from the truth. The goods sold in Spain were expensive and of poor quality, work-
ers’ wages were so low that attempting to hold down two jobs was the norm and the level of 
per capita income even fell relative to that of our trading partners. 
The situation changed radically with the opening up of the Spanish economy, when we began 
to resemble other developed countries. Indeed, this process, which started with the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan and culminated in accession to the European Union in 1985, has seen Spain 
successfully converge on European standards of living. The opening up of the economy did 
not only not lead to the disappearance of industry and agriculture; it also raised Spaniards’ 
standard of living signifi cantly. 
In short, what was apparently a singular system protecting us was leading us down the road 
to disaster. It was not until an acute crisis hit us hard at the end of the 1950s that we realised 
that what distinguished us from other countries and what we thought was protecting us was 
actually achieving the opposite.
It is now precisely in Spain, where employment protection purports to be in good health thanks 
to the high unemployment severance packages on top of government benefi ts, where labour 
shedding in the face of the current economic crisis is proving fi ercer than in other countries. 
For this reason we should study the experience, for example, of Austria and Denmark, whose 
labour market reforms can offer us some ideas for reform at home. In Denmark, where the 
unemployment rate is 4.1%, the authorities opted to improve regular benefi t payments and to 
practically eliminate redundancy payments. In Austria, where the unemployment rate is 3.8%, 
fi rms set up an individual fund for each worker which becomes available if workers loses their 
job, acting as a top-up to government unemployment benefi ts. When workers fi nd employ-
ment in another fi rm, the unused portion of the fund goes with them and starts growing once 
again with the new fi rm’s contributions. At the end of their working life, the funds available are 
an additional source of retirement income. 
The virtue of these systems is that they do not deter worker mobility. This is so in Austria be-
cause, by not forgoing their “established rights”, it is workers themselves who manage the 
accumulated resources during periods in which they are unemployed. Also, this arrangement 
offers protection to all workers, even those whose previous terms of employment have been 
short-lived. In Denmark, the choice was of a system which fi rmly supports the unemployed 
(with substantial unemployment subsidies and intensive training programmes) in a setting in 
which, however, fi ring costs are very low.
Just as 50 years ago the external sector crisis obliged Spain to change its trade protection 
policy, the current, serious unemployment crisis should lead us to examine what we can 
change in our labour market, given what other countries have done with very favourable re-
sults. Admittedly, this is nothing new, since the Banco de España has reiterated in its annual 
reports, at least in the past 10 years, the need for such reform. What is new is that reform has 
now become absolutely vital; otherwise, when we emerge from the current crisis, and in the 
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absence of the instruments that were used in the past, we will be liable to grow far below what 
we did in previous decades. 
The reform of labour institutions is a pressing task, since the short-run effects on hiring are 
absolutely necessary in the current circumstances. But we require action on another front, 
even though the effects are longer-term. I refer to education. Undoubtedly, progress in educa-
tion is Spain’s most important outstanding task in respect of economic growth, enhanced 
productivity, fairer income distribution and also the attainment of low unemployment. True, 
Spain has advanced in some fi elds here, such as university education and business schools. 
But we continue to take up the rear as regards the average quality of our citizens’ educational 
attainment, with the serious consequences this entails. 
It is well known that countries with a better educated population are characterised by having 
higher wages, lower unemployment rates and a higher labour market participation rate. For ex-
ample, both in Denmark and in the United Kingdom, more than two-thirds of the population have 
a post-compulsory education qualifi cation, as against only 50% in the case of Spain. In both 
countries, the average worker has 30% higher spending power than Spanish workers, and their 
unemployment rates in 2007 were 3% and 5%, respectively, less than half the level in Spain.
This relationship between training and wages is explained by the fact that more highly edu-
cated workers are more effi cient, and therefore obtain higher wages, and by the fact that 
employers always prefer to fi re the least productive workers. In fact, the unemployment rate in 
Spain for persons with only a primary education has increased in 2008 by almost 8 pp, as 
against 5 pp in the case of those with a secondary education and only 2 pp in that of persons 
with a further education. The data also show that not only are the largest increases in the un-
employment rate among groups with lower levels of education, but that these groups also 
have the highest unemployment rates. 
Yet we should not only strive to improve the educational attainment of our workers before they 
start working. We should also promote training within the fi rm. If we managed to make our 
labour market institutions more like those of other developed countries, we would also do 
away with labour market arrangements that hinder workplace training and do not give employ-
ers any incentive to improve their fi rms’ human capital. 
We urgently need a debate between all political, economic and social agents to convince them 
of the need for reforms. The government and the parties who support it, the opposition par-
ties, trade unions, employers, academics, researchers and the media should all participate. 
And we should not forget those who the reforms would benefi t most: unemployed workers 
and employers who still do not exist, but who would be able to if there were a signifi cant struc-
tural change in labour market institutions. 
Without suffi cient social acceptance this debate will obviously not even be joined, so it is very 
important to clearly underline the objectives pursued which I’ve repeated ad nauseam in this 
speech, but which I shall attempt to express again in a different way so as not to tire you. We 
should all agree that the best protection against unemployment is not that which concerns it-
self with subsidising the unemployed, but that which ensures that the majority do not lose their 
job. We should admit that it is useful to allow employers to improve their productivity because 
that way we will see higher real wage growth. And, fi nally, we should let workers take the op-
portunity to switch to better-paid jobs without losing a substantial part of their protection in the 
event that they lose such jobs. 
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You will have realised that my approach to the debate on labour market reform is far removed 
from that of those who confi ne it to the question of whether or not to lower dismissal costs. In 
my view it is a mistake to debate cheaper fi ring alone, and I believe that we can only make 
headway if we focus on fi nding formulae that allow us to increase productivity, to reduce the 
numbers of unemployed and to improve workers’ wages.
The fact that Spain is today more advanced than other European countries in many areas 
that I mentioned at the start of my speech should not let us forget that there are still some 
fi elds in which we can learn from others. It is precisely this attitude of having learnt from oth-
ers, and made the consequent reforms, which largely explains the positive performance of 
the Spanish economy in recent decades. In my opinion, the time has come to do the same 
(to learn and to reform) with labour market institutions which, as systematically stated by in-
ternational organisations, are the major structural difference remaining between us and the 
more developed countries.
We must acknowledge that the task is not an easy one. Apart from convincing people about 
their necessity, something historians and economists can help do, the skills of many others will 
be needed to design and implement the reforms. One thorny issue is how to set some chang-
es in motion immediately and, at the same time, be sensitive to what may be seen as an al-
teration of established rights. Political acuity is crucial to resolve these problems, as indeed it is 
also to make the interests of the different groups of workers compatible with each other. But it 
should also reassure us to know that the reform toolbox is full of possibilities: calendars, com-
pensation, incentives, etc. Lawyers also have an important job to do, since the problem with all 
structural reforms is that they alter the status quo and, accordingly, it is essential to fi nd legal 
formulae that circumvent the obstacles that may arise in their approval and implementation.
The diffi culties that may arise, not only when reforming but also in opening the debate, may 
lead some to ask why, without reforms and, in particular, without modifying our labour market 
institutions, Spain won’t be able to grow as in the past. From what I’ve said already you can 
imagine my reply. It is possible that Spain may be able to grow as in the past, but it is highly 
unlikely. And I say that it is possible solely because, following the general failure of most of the 
forecasts that have been made during the current crisis, we should all be more humble when 
postulating about the future. Honestly, though, it is more diffi cult to imagine today how, without 
reforms, the Spanish economy can perform as favourably in the future as it has done in the last 
few decades. Moreover, what do we gain by refusing to learn from others about what can re-
duce the rate of unemployment and raise labour productivity and real wages? Even if our 
economy can grow again as it has in the past, with low productivity and with higher unemploy-
ment and lower wages than our neighbours, that would not seem to be preferable to the 
strategies for growth that they apply.
Allow me one fi nal consideration on an argument occasionally deployed, when there are no 
other arguments left, for not adopting structural measures. These reforms, it is said, may work 
very well, but they should be postponed until later because they are not useful for exiting the 
current crisis. Firstly, some of these reforms, such as those conducive to hiring, would clearly 
have immediate effects in resolving the main problem of the current crisis, namely unemploy-
ment. Yet while it is true that other structural reforms would not have immediate direct effects 
but would yield future results, the decisions economic agents take today depend greatly on 
how they see the future. What has brought decisions to consume and invest today to a grind-
ing halt is mistrust of the future; accordingly, if confi dence about the future is restored, that 
would have highly benefi cial effects not only in the medium run but now, in the present. 
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In sum, tomorrow we’ll broach again the fi nancial and real-sector crisis facing us. And how to 
exit it. We’ll be refl ecting on how to break the vicious circles of the lack of confi dence. We’ll 
discuss how it is naive to believe these vicious circles can be broken only in one place, con-
cluding that what we need is a recovery in the confi dence of all economic agents. These 
measures cannot be taken only at the national level; the crisis is a global one and attempts 
should be made to coordinate action to the full worldwide. That makes very strong demands 
on all multilateral fora and institutions, governments, politicians, central bankers, supervisors 
and all those with responsibilities in the matter. We must all continue doing all we can to 
emerge from the current situation.
Today, however, I wanted to pause and look beyond the crisis. For one thing, we do not know 
how deep and long it may be. But what is certain is that this crisis will end. We are certain we 
will fi nally emerge from it. This is not wishful thinking, but an empirical regularity. The economy 
has worked this way at least since the time Joseph interpreted the Pharaoh’s dream about 
lean and fat cows.
I wanted to focus today on the future of the Spanish economy because the essentially macr-
oeconomic dimension of the current crisis makes us forget certain things: that our main prob-
lems are structural; that our chief task is to improve and boost productivity; that we ought to 
seize the moment to reform our regulations and institutions; and because whatever we do to 
improve productivity does not run counter to exiting the crisis but, quite on the contrary, may 
help us emerge more rapidly from it.
To conclude, let me reiterate what I said earlier. If I’ve talked of only one area of structural re-
form, namely labour reform, it is because I think it is the most important one for re-launching 
corporate start-ups and reducing unemployment. But is it not the only area of reform, and nor 
are others less necessary. Giving a greater degree of legal security to rental contracts, and 
liberalising the related terms, is absolutely necessary for reducing rental costs and for making 
a smoother real estate adjustment, without a collapse of the value of the wealth in which Span-
iards have their assets concentrated. Re-launching privatisation, liberalisation and the boost-
ing of competition in numerous sectors is vital because, by reducing unwarranted business 
margins, workers’ real wages can be increased without harming competitiveness. And thus 
we could say for many more areas of reform. But we’d need many more speeches to talk 
about this. And fear not, I won’t be making them today.
Thank you.
11.2.2009.
